PHIL 4040 - Week 2, Section 2 : Of the Origin of Ideas

     Today's reading seemed to be another way of understanding this duality of human reasoning and doing that Hume is trying to construct. This time, Hume uses the terms "thoughts/ideas" and "impressions" to describe how human understanding works. Note, I used the word "seem" earlier. While "reasoning" and "doing" are paired to describe how a painter successfully paints the goddess Venus and why it's impossible for someone who has never eaten almonds to imagine what they taste like, "ideas" and "impressions" are paired to describe how reasoning originates. Though I cannot support this inference with the text, I can infer that the "idea-impression" duality is the way Hume is trying to break down the faculty of "reasoning" into simpler parts, since both ideas and impressions occur within the human mind, whereas action--doing--occurs externally.

     Arguably, impressions occur externally, yet I would counter-argue that exactly one thing or event can have two different impressions on two persons. This would imply a factor of interpretation is involved within the creation of the impression, as it would make no sense to say that two bodies, being exact clones, were given two different impressions of one thing, unless that thing is being experienced differently due to circumstances external to the mind (such as the angle of view, distance, or speed of the observer). Assuming no such circumstances exist, it makes more sense to say that, instead, two different persons made two different impressions of one thing, since the ability for two different impressions to be made entails the presence of two persons. Notice I use the word "different." If I used the word "separate," then the impressions betwixt the clones and the two persons could be the same impression, and, if we only knew what kinds of impressions were being received, we could never conclude whether there was one or two people present. By this, I'm also more inclined to say that if the very same two impressions were made on two people by one thing, then there was only ever one impression, and that one impression was mutually shared amongst the two persons. However, the existence of any likelihood of one impression being shared by two persons does not detriment the claim that impressions are parts of the faculty of reasoning, or within the mind, since there is one remaining vein in which the lines of reasoning are allowed to differ: ideas.

     For there to be two lines of reasoning, assuming the impressions of two persons to be the same, we must then also assume the latter half of reasoning, the half involving ideas, is how two such lines of reasoning differ, as that is the only remaining place in which they can differ. Ideas derived from the same impression can be different, because ideas are made purely through the cogitations within the human mind. This may seem to beg the question, but it cannot be denied that, if they vary to even the tiniest degree, two different human minds will think differently. Sure, impressions can be received as the same, but what occurs afterwards--the process of uniting those impressions with the imagination--will, indeed, be what causes different ideas to originate. Not to mention that we can describe a situation where two different human minds exist by virtue of the fact that there are two distinct, simultaneous ideas, and if, on the contrary, they were perfectly synchronized in both the formation of ideas and the absorption of impressions, then they must be one in the same mind.

     In short, I therefore assert that impressions are solely parts of "reasoning" because it is possible for one thing to leave more than one impression on more than one person and to be the origin of a multiplicity of coincidentally-occurring ideas.

     Yes, this is an absurd amount of information to take in, but allow me to make confetti of this confusion with a few examples and illustrations:

Here's a template of the situation:
Above I have illustrated the situation. The person receiving Impression 1 is depicted to the left, thinking Thought 1, and the person receiving Impression 2 is depicted to the right, thinking Thought 2. Each of these impressions is derived from one experience, shared by both persons (though the impressions are not shared). Enough of these generalizations. We want to see what's really happening here. Here is an example:

While the person on the left's impression of the knife as a tool originates in him the thought of slicing bread for some breakfast, the rightward person's impression of the knife as a weapon originates in him the thought of murdering his promiscuous daughter once she comes home from high school. Though both persons may have bread they want to slice or daughters they want to murder, the differences in their lines of reasons originates at the impressions they are given of the thing (the knife) they are mutually experiencing.

     Now, if we decided that we wanted to get rid of the person on the right because he is a psychopath, and replace him with an exact clone of the person on the left, would it at least be rational to believe their impressions and ideas, and thus their lines of reasoning, would have no differences whatsoever (factoring out the aforementioned external circumstances)? If this is the case, would we be able to tell, just by knowing the thoughts of each clone, if there was two people exposed to the inspiration (the knife), or one person?

...

     Two days later, I believe I've come to a conclusion on this matter. Though the knowledge of just their impressions would indicate they are one mind, the clones consist of two minds, as their thoughts take place in two separate, spatial locations. Yet, this brings about an unexpected conclusion. Impression are parts of reasoning because no two impressions can be the same, even if they are brought about by the same object or event. This is because every mind is, necessarily, taking place in its own spatial location, therefore their impressions draw on differing perspectives. 

     I'm more inclined to agree with this conclusion because, if we deny location of the mind, where reasoning is done, then it would be impossible to tell whether or not impressions occur in the mind, and thus, whether or not they are parts of reasoning. It would be impossible because, if the mind has no location (we disregard perspective), then two persons can share one mind if they have the same thoughts, making it impossible to tell if the impression is being internalized within that one mind, or is a thought-commanding outward experience that affects all persons the same. Since I'm sure of my conclusion in the former scenario and unsure in my second, I will go with the sure conclusion that could be true for either scenario and call it at that.

A note:
"When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea, we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?"

---------------------------------------------------------Enquiry, pp 13